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Introduction
This paper is a brief outline of a very large topic and also a small part of a book 
project.1)  Prior to the time of Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) religion in Japan was a rela-
tively simple matter, and there was at best a weak sense of either collective or individ-
ual identity.  In terms of religion, Buddhism’s denominations could be counted on two 
hands: catholic and highly doctrinal denominations like Tendai and Shingon vied with 
protestant denominations that emphasized correct action more than correct belief, and 
included the faith-based salviﬁc Pure Land variants, the exclusivist Lotus teachings of 
Nichiren-shū, and the elitist contemplative Zen schools.  Taken together these Bud-
dhist denominations contributed the prevailing world view, cosmology, ethics, ontolo-
gy and epistemology that characterized medieval Japan.  Belief in kami was wide-
spread and almost universal, but it would be premature to identify this as Shinto as it 
is known it today, and in the perennial struggle between Buddhist church (Buppo¯ 仏法 ) 
and state (O¯bo¯ 王法 ) in Japan—which dates to at least the Nara period—the state was 
consistently a poor second.
Resting his case in substantial measure on the fact that shu¯kyo¯ (宗教), the most com-
monly used term for religion in Japan, is an early-Meiji neologism, Jason Ānanda Jo-
sephson has argued that there was no formal concept of “religion” in Japan until West-
erners demanded freedom of such.2)  In Japan, Isomae Jun’ichi 磯前順一 has led a 
similar charge in his Tokyo University 2010 doctoral dissertation, which has recently 
been translated into and published in English.3)  Linguistic determinism does argue 
that people who speak or think in different languages have different thought processes 
and thus experience the world differently.4)  Linguistic relativity challenges this posi-
tion by asking questions such as whether one can experience a shade of color for 
which one’s language lacks a specific name or term, or whether cumulus nimbus 
clouds can be observed if there is no agreed-upon native word for them, to which the 
obvious answer in both cases is of course.  But, Josephson’s and Isomae’s arguments 
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can easily be misunderstood: yes, it is the case that at the midpoint of the nineteenth 
century, religion was understood differently in Japan and in Europe, but this does not 
mean that there was no religion in Japan until Westerners revealed its secrets and of-
fered keys to its understanding. 
As recently as thirty-ﬁve years ago similar claims based on linguistic determinism 
were raised regarding orthodox Neo-Confucianism arguing that since the term 
“Neo-Confucianism” is a twentieth-century neologism, Neo-Confucianism did not ex-
ist in Edo-period Japan in either orthodox or heterodox fashion.  Such terms as 
Shushigaku (朱子学 ), Dōgaku (道学 ) and Yōmeigaku (陽明学 ) notwithstanding, 
proponents of this counter-intuitive view seized upon the frequently imprecise and 
variegated use of the term “Neo-Confucianism” to argue for the absence of equivalen-
cy.  Indeed, one could make similar claims about “religion” and even about “Japan.”5) 
I challenged this view nearly thirty-ﬁve years ago by organizing a symposium on the 
theme of responses to Neo-Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan in which we conﬁrmed 
the existence of the cause by examining its effects.6)  In 2013, I organized another 
symposium in which we examined evidence for the relatively and surprisingly high 
levels of individuality in early modern Japan, something that conventional wisdom re-
peatedly rejected until not long ago.7)
Christianity
In a sense Christianity changed everything.  The Tokugawa state initially aspired to 
control every aspect of one’s behavior, including the spiritual realm of one’s religious 
afﬁliation.  Christianity was the ﬁrst religion to be banned in Japan, but it was certainly 
not alone.  The Bakufu refused to tolerate the separatist deﬁance of the fujufuse (不受
不施 ) movement within Nichiren-shū Buddhism, as well as what it perceived to be the 
destabilizing impact of Pure Land ecstatic dancing movements called odori nenbutsu (踊
念仏 ). Once these prohibitions became a matter of law, the most straightforward way 
for the Bakufu to ensure compliance was to require all persons to register with a local 
temple belonging to one of the ofﬁcially recognized denominations of Buddhism, a 
strategy that was known as the Shu¯mon aratame (宗門改め ).  Kurozumi Makoto has 
observed that the requirement to demonstrate that one is not a Christian contributed 
to an enduring and ironic Christian inﬂuence on early modern Japanese society,8) as 
has been conﬁrmed more recently in Jan C. Leuchtenberger’s study of an enduring 
Christian presence in early modern Japanese literature.9)  What Kurozumi and others 
neglected, however, is how the individual responsibility to perform one’s obedience to 
the decrees of the Bakuhan realm contributed to an acknowledgement of the nascent 
integrity of the individual.
Consider the following contemporary description by a foreign observer, Engelbert 
Kaempfer (1651-1716) who was a German physician attached for two years 1690-92 to 
the Dutch trading post on the islet of Deshima in Nagasaki harbor.  Kaempfer wrote 
of how at the end of each year, the neighborhood liaison “for each street conducts the 
hito aratame, that is, the registration of all members of the household, including the 
children and old people, specifying their personal name, place of birth and the shu¯, or 
religious sect of the head of the household.”10)  In areas like Nagasaki notorious for 
their experience with Christianity and Christians, the practice of the efumi (絵踏み ) 
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was used to sniff out practitioners of the proscribed faith.  Kaempfer described how 
within days of this registration, local ofﬁcials went street-by-street and house-by-house 
requiring all residents of a household to desecrate an “image of the cruciﬁed Christ 
and on another one of a saint to show that they renounce and curse Christ and his 
messengers.”  Kaempfer wrote:
“After the inquisition council has sat down on a mat and everybody, young 
and old, as well as additional families lodged in the same house and the clos-
est neighbors, if their house is not large enough to conduct the procedure 
there separately, have assembled and the cast images have been placed on 
the bare ﬂoor, the scribe opens his inspection register and reads the names. 
As people’s names are read, they come forward and walk over the images or step 
on them.  Small children who cannot yet walk are picked up by their mothers 
and have their feet placed on the images as expression of disdain.  After that, 
the head of the household puts his seal at the bottom of the inspection register 
so that the inquisitors can prove to the magistrates that the inquisition has tak-
en place in the house.”11)
Note the overlapping levels of jurisdiction.  The inquisition of the population is orga-
nized by household, and heads of household have responsibility for those who live 
under their roofs, regardless of kinship ties.  However, the actual reckoning and 
demonstration of the efumi occurs one named person at a time, children and the elder-
ly included, and is in this sense an individual responsibility.  Further even the inquisi-
tors themselves are dependent on the head-of-household’s seal on their inspection reg-
ister to demonstrate to their own minders that the inquisition has taken place.  Such 
demonstrations were a form of performance, and in a study of the political spaces in 
Tokugawa Japan, Luke Roberts has observed that the “ability to command perfor-
mance of duty—in the thespian sense when actual performance of duty might be lack-
ing—was a crucial tool of Tokugawa power that effectively worked toward preserving 
the peace in the realm.”12)  For our purposes in this essay, however, the critical point is 
that it was an individual performance that one could not perform on behalf of another.
In this same context, consider the offer made in 1629 by Takenaka Uneme, the Ba-
kufu-appointed Commissioner (Bugyō 奉行) to Nagasaki, to Antonio Ishida (1570-
1632), a Jesuit priest arrested for his activities on behalf of his Catholic faith.  Uneme 
is said to have proposed to Ishida that if he would only formally acknowledge his obe-
dience to the Shogun’s laws, he could “continue to believe what he pleased in his own 
heart.”13)  This remarkable offer suggests the existence of an individual sphere of pri-
vacy, which allowed for liberty in matters of personal beliefs, though categorically not 
in the physical performance of one’s faith.  Examples like this of the gap between what 
the law demanded and what was in reality allowed existed at all levels of Tokugawa 
society, and it is this space between the state as public authority and the individual as 
semi-autonomous actor that stands out.
The contribution of Christianity to the construction of individual identity was a neg-
ative one, in the sense that it was the persecution of Christians for their faith and reli-
gious practices rather than anything distinctively doctrinal that contributed the most to 
this individual responsibility and one’s attendant identity as a Christian practitioner, 
but Christianity was by no means the only religion or thought-system (I have in mind 
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anything that qualiﬁes in Japanese as 思想 ) that contributed to the emergence of iden-
tity, and beyond identity to individuality.  The remainder of this essay will thus focus 
in each case brieﬂy on the following—Buddhism, orthodox Neo-Confucianism (朱子
学・道学 ), Itō Jinsai’s kogaku (古学 ) and Ogyū Sorai’s kobunjigaku (古文辞学 ), and 
the kokugaku (国学 ) of Kamo no Mabuchi 賀茂真淵 and Motoori Norinaga本居宣長
—examining their direct and indirect contributions to the creation of identity and in-
dividuality during the Edo period.
Buddhism
With its persistent denial of the existence of a permanent self or soul, it is difﬁcult to 
argue that Buddhist doctrine contributed in any signiﬁcant ontological or conceptual 
fashion to either identity or individuality in early modern Japan, but there still are 
points that deserve our attention.  First, all Buddhists agreed that as sentient creatures, 
part of the human endowment includes a Buddha-nature or Buddha-mind (Bussho¯ , 
Busshin 仏性 , 仏心 ) that represents the dharma (仏法 ) within, and that makes en-
lightenment possible.  This common nature or mind linked all persons into a single 
humanity, but one that also included heavenly beings like Buddhas and bodhisattvas 
as well as degraded creatures like denizens of hell ( jigoku 地獄 ) and hungry ghosts (gaki 
餓鬼).  And second, despite the Pure Land doctrinal emphasis on the denial of 
self-power ( jiriki 自力 ) and insistence on relying on supernatural power outside one-
self (tariki 他力 ), Pure Land Buddhists along with Nichiren followers emphasized the 
individual responsibility for reciting the nenbutsu (念仏 ) or daimoku (題目 ) invoca-
tions.  Zen Buddhism of course also had a close connection with bushi (武士 ), who 
were at the forefront of early modern efforts to make a name for oneself and thus pio-
neers of individuality, and Zen’s Ōbaku variant was an important contributor to the 
faddish interest in China as an exotic Other during the eighteenth century.
But it was Buddhism’s institutional importance that is of greatest interest to this pa-
per’s argument.  Because of the requirement that all births, deaths, divorces, house-
hold membership and movements be recorded at local parish temples, all persons in 
Edo-period Japan were nominally Buddhist, making Buddhism the virtual state reli-
gion of Tokugawa Japan.  One could certainly believe in other forms of spirituality 
and spiritual practices, Shingaku (心学 ) and divination (占い ) being among many 
examples, but one’s spiritual “foundation” was always Buddhist even for as committed 
a nativist as Motoori Norinaga.14)
Changing one’s afﬁliation from one Buddhist denomination to another was notori-
ously difﬁcult, but still possible under exceptional circumstances, and the arrangement 
of all Japanese temples into a main temple — branch temple (honji-matsuji 本寺・末寺 ) 
network contributed to a spiritual arterial system that at least in theory allowed for Ba-
kufu oversight and management of temple affairs.15)  It is also well known that the Ba-
kufu appointed Commissioners for Temple and Shrine Affairs ( Jisha Bugyō 寺社奉行 ) 
who were responsible for enforcement of the Bakufu’s religious policies, but after 
reaching a high-water mark during the mid-seventeenth century, enforcement or the 
Bakufu’s religious policies grew increasingly uneven and sporadic until late in the 
eighteenth century.  As I have argued elsewhere, for violators of the Bakufu’s religious 
policies, concealing oneself for one’s victimless transgressions was not as difﬁcult as 
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imagined, creating in effect a de facto sphere of privacy in one’s personal religious 
practices.16)
Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism (朱子学・道学 )
Confucianism looms large in this discussion, especially in its orthodox Neo-Confu-
cian variants.17)  First, Confucianism contributed to Tokugawa social organization by 
placing priority on households, which were understood to be the building blocks of 
society, as well as the laboratories in which personal growth in the direction of good-
ness takes its ﬁrst steps.  The Tokugawa Bakufu used households for its own statist pur-
poses by making them responsible for mutual surveillance in the so-called Five-House-
hold and Ten-household (goningumi 五 人 組 , ju¯ningumi 十 人 組 ) systems, whereby 
households in variously sized groupings were mutually responsible for each other’s 
transgressions, obligations and surveillance.  But during the seventeenth century, Con-
fucianism went beyond this socio-political role by winning the hearts and minds of 
leading intellectuals as well as religious leaders within the Shinto community.
Orthodox Neo-Confucianism offered an altogether new understanding of human 
nature, positing that all of humanity shared a common and originally good nature (本
然の性 ), which at least in theory provided a universal potential for sagehood.  That 
people fell short of the mark of perfect goodness was owing to their inability to project 
this original nature in their relationships.  At the same time orthodox Neo-Confucian-
ism explained that all persons had a physical nature (気質之性 ) that was uniquely 
their own and contained imperfections, which inhibited perfect relationships.  The 
good news was that one could learn to overcome these imperfections through self-cul-
tivation, which included learning how to tranquilize the inherent turbulence of the 
physical nature and thus to harmonize oneself with the Way of Heaven.
This Neo-Confucian understanding of a bifurcated dual nature provided a meta-
physical foundation for the subsequent development of both individuality and collec-
tive identity, at first within a Confucian context and later within a nativist context. 
Clearly, if we all equally share a common human nature, we are part of a common 
collective humanity.  At the same time, if our speciﬁc physical natures are inﬁnitely 
variegated, therein lies the foundation for an acceptance of individual difference and 
hence individuality.  Further, because the mind (心 ) was where the most fundamental 
principles of goodness resided, and because the mind is what linked individuals to the 
cosmos around them, understanding the mind was a religious quest of the highest or-
der, and the pursuit of this “true mind” (honshin 本心 for Buddhists and magokoro 真心 
for nativists) was part of a broader path to human perfection.18)
Perhaps the greatest difference with the pre-Tokugawa Buddhist understanding of 
humanity was Neo-Confucianism’s emphasis on human development through self-cul-
tivation, something that medieval Buddhism would have regarded as almost prepos-
terous and precariously selﬁsh.  Self-cultivation was a critical issue for Confucians as 
well as liberal Buddhists during the Tokugawa period, and if there was any lingering 
problem with the notion of self-cultivation, it was that the activity is so obviously 
self-centered and hence prone to the criticism of being self-ish.  Early modern forms of 
self-cultivation thus required apologetics, which tended to emphasize the possibility of 
creating a perfect society for everyone by perfecting one individual at a time.  Self-cul-
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tivation was also part of a broader early modern interest in self-improvement and per-
sonal advancement (self-interest).
Bitō Masahide (1923-2013) was perhaps the ﬁrst to argue that the roots of modern 
Japanese individualism were to be found in orthodox (Zhu Xi style) Neo-Confucian-
ism’s mandate to its proponents to contribute to the social order by individually 
“plumbing principle” (kyu¯ri 窮理 ), i.e., interrogating the true nature of things as a way 
of analogously interrogating the true nature of one’s original endowment.19)  In fact, it 
is precisely this altruistic dimension to self-cultivation that made it socially acceptable 
during the ideologically charged years of the early Tokugawa, though the extreme in-
tellectualism of the activity also constrained its broader acceptance.
Confucianism from the outset exhibited a concern with a correct understanding of 
the past, and this helps us to understand why there were more works written on Japa-
nese history during the seventeenth century than in all of Japanese history before 
1600.  Within this cornucopia of seventeenth-century historical writing one ﬁnds ex-
plicit conﬁdence in and gratitude for the stability of the Bakuhan state, but for our pur-
poses the greater signiﬁcance lies in the fact that in subtle ways, the past was becoming 
the patrimony.  In other words, even though Confucianism supported the notion of an 
infinitely hierarchical and stratified society, it also supported a horizontal fraternity 
whereby all persons in Japan were equal heirs to the blessings of Japan’s historical 
past.
With the civilianization of the samurai class in an age of relative peace, the honorif-
ic valor that had once been part of the reward for success in combat was attained 
through other means during the Tokugawa period, and one of these was the ability to 
demonstrate—and note here again the requirement of performance—one’s knowl-
edge of Confucianism.20)  For roughly the first Tokugawa century, progressive do-
mains hired their own Confucian scholars like Kumazawa Banzan (1619-1691熊沢蕃
山 ) or Yamazaki Ansai (1619-1682山崎闇斎 ) to train domainal samurai in ways that 
would render them of more use to administration while at the same time instilling in 
them those values deemed appropriate to and supportive of their respective forms of 
service, like loyalty (shin 信 ) and reverence (kei 敬 ).
Demand grew for such knowledge as its value increased for those who possessed it, 
creating an opening for the development of the private academy, i.e., an academy in 
which the instructor was compensated by the tuition of his students rather than sala-
ried.  The pioneer of the private Confucian academy was Itō Jinsai (1627-1705伊藤仁
斎 ), who went against the wishes of his merchant-class parents who wanted their bril-
liant son to study medicine, and instead followed his heart by starting a reading group, 
the Dōshikai (同志会 ) or Society of the Like-Minded, which gathered regularly under 
his leadership to read, study and discuss the classic works of Confucianism.  This 
neighborhood study group grew to the point where it transitioned naturally into a fully 
self-sustaining private academy, the Kogidō ( 古義堂 ), which attracted hundreds of 
paying students during Jinsai’s lifetime and thousands more after his death.
The principal activity in Jinsai’s academy and others like it was a reading-and-dis-
cussion strategy called kaidoku (会読 ) or “gathering to read,” in which students would 
interrogate a text collectively under the leadership of a scholar, but in a manner that 
involved vigorous mutual interaction.  Maeda Tsutomu has argued that far from a pas-
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sive activity, kaidoku developed into an accepted way of expressing individual opinion 
and thereby came to promote individual personal development through debate and 
academic enquiry.21)  That non-samurai commoners could express opinions and en-
gage in intellectual disagreements with samurai within the conﬁnes of the academy 
confirms this as a venue where individuals could interact in ways that would have 
been unlikely in more public surroundings.
From roughly the 1660s on Japanese scholarly circles began to break away from 
their initial embrace of orthodox Neo-Confucianism, opening the way for the radical 
ontological break represented by Ogyū Sorai’s Way of the Former Kings as a means 
to instruct people who no longer knew how to cultivate themselves or how to bring 
peace to the world.22)  And taking this argument to its logical conclusion, it was not 
until Sorai’s ideas reached their peak of popular acceptance in the 1740s and began 
their decline that the way was opened to the resurrection of self-cultivation strategies 
of a fundamentally new kind, that of the private academy, initially Confucian and sub-
sequently nativist.
Kokugaku (国学 Nativism)
We have already noted how a Confucian-inspired concern with the past trans-
formed Japan’s historical heritage into a kind of patrimony shared equally by all Japa-
nese.  In a similar vein, the nativist concern with Japanese identity similarly implied 
that whatever their differences, all persons born in Japan are equally Japanese.  Kamo 
no Mabuchi’s and Motoori Norinaga’s eighteenth-century nativist constructions dif-
fered in any number of important ways but nonetheless shared with their Neo-Confu-
cian rivals the conviction that individuals share a common disposition.  As described 
above, in orthodox Neo-Confucianism this was represented by the originally good na-
ture that enabled one to conform oneself effortlessly to the Way of Heaven.  Japanese 
nativists likewise believed that they and their countrymen possessed distinctive and 
essentially genetic attributes that similarly enabled their conformity to a uniquely Jap-
anese Way: for Mabuchi this was the magokoro (真心) or True Heart (Mind) that made 
possible one’s return to the Natural Way of Heaven and Earth (天地自然の道 ), and 
for Norinaga it was one’s Japanese Heart (Mind) or Yamatogokoro (大和心 ) that en-
abled the resurrection of the Way of the Kami or Shinto (神の道 ) in the here-and-
now.23)
At the same time and as just mentioned, both orthodox Neo-Confucianism and na-
tivism allowed for individual difference, though in subtly different ways for Mabuchi 
and Norinaga.  Mabuchi’s arcadia was premised not on homogeneity or docility but 
rather on transparency and mutual understanding.  Collective identity in Mabuchi’s 
writings was thus balanced by an appreciation of individual identity or individuality, 
perhaps because  Mabuchi himself was a well-known antiquarian eccentric, whose no-
toriety was sufﬁcient to earn him posthumous inclusion in Ban Kokei’s (伴 蒿蹊 1733-
1806) “Eccentrics of Our Times” (Kinsei kijinden 近世奇人伝 ).  In Norinaga’s case, his 
Shinto determinism meant that individual behavior was as morally variegated as the 
80,000 (yaoyorozu 八百万 ) kami.
The construction of identity is always facilitated by the positing of an Other—
something or someone against which to juxtapose oneself—and for the nativists this 
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Other was China, or more speciﬁcally Chinese rationalism and morality as represent-
ed principally by Confucianism.  Ancient Japan, according to Mabuchi, was governed 
well, but the natural sincerity and directness of ancient people were abruptly changed 
and replaced by chaos upon the introduction of craftily convincing theories from 
abroad. The good news, according to Mabuchi, was that the ancient arcadia and its 
virtues were recoverable by mastering the verses of the Man’yo¯shu¯, taking their spirit as 
one’s own, and thereby restoring one’s original Japanese identity.
Mabuchi’s and Norinaga’s different understandings of human nature as a preroga-
tive of one’s Japaneseness also carried implications for differing ethical valences.24)  In 
the case of Mabuchi, all humans—even Chinese—enjoy at birth hearts that are un-
corrupted by Buddhist moralism or Confucian rationalism, and it is fundamentally 
their exposure to these destabilizing forms of didacticism that generates a kind of craft-
iness (さかしら ) and scheming.  Mabuchi claimed that it was evidence of a country’s 
moral lassitude if it needed to invent ethical teachings, and that the absence of such 
teachings in ancient Japan was evidence of its intrinsic natural moral superiority.  By 
this reasoning, the effect of introducing Buddhist and moral teachings was akin to giv-
ing a healthy patient a dose of too-strong medicine that has the ironic effect of making 
the person ill instead of well.
Again, however, note that the pre-moral societal perfection that Mabuchi champi-
oned was not based on any concept of universal goodness but rather on a kind of in-
terpersonal transparency that precluded the minor ethical lapses which form a part of 
everyday life from festering into something more toxic.  Accordingly, if one were to 
use the verses of the Man’yo¯shu¯ as a medium to re-enter the ancient arcadia and there-
by resurrect its virtues, the principal characteristic of the new/ancient persona would 
not be ethical perfection but rather a kind of social harmony with misdemeanors to be 
sure, but not felonious intent.  In other words, for Mabuchi, a degree of mischief—
both then and now—is both natural and inevitable.
Motoori Norinaga’s kami-determinism likewise contains the seeds of problematic 
ethical implications.  If human dispositions are as variegated as the inﬁnite variety of 
kami, some good and some bad and every variation in between, and if these kami are 
ultimately in complete control of all human behavior, what is to stop one from saying 
a kind of Japanese exculpatory equivalent to what in a Judeo-Christian context would 
be “the devil made me do it”?  Shimizu Masaaki has interpreted this as an issue of 
truth/sincerity (誠実 ) vs. lies/falsity (虚偽 ), and in much the same was as Takeuchi’s 
linguistic argument regarding the dual character of 自 (おのずから vs. みずから ) Shi-
mizu regards this as deleterious to any doctrine of individual responsibility, suggestive 
of a disquieting gap (間 ) between individuality and individual responsibility of a sort 
that does not have an analogue in the Confucianism with which nativism shared so 
much in the way of assumptions and ﬁrst principles.25)
Conclusions
Despite arguments to the contrary, religions like Buddhism and Christianity, and 
religious modes of thought like Confucianism and nativism were alive and well during 
the Edo period.  For proof of this, one need look no further than the fact that they 
contributed directly and indirectly, institutionally and intellectually to the distinctive 
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matrix that constitutes early modern Japanese values and identity.
And what about religions and religious thought in Japan today?  One often hears it 
said that no more than 1-2% of Japanese people today embrace Christianity, but one 
also hears that only about 15% of Japanese today follow any doctrinal religion, mean-
ing that one-in-ten of those who do are Christian.  Not unlike the Bakufu of two centu-
ries ago, Japan’s government today seems once again eager to “protect” people from 
doctrines and theologies that resist its authority, confirming that the centuries-old 
struggle between “church” and “state” is ongoing.  This, in turn, also suggests that de-
spite relatively low levels of religious participation, religions and religious ideas con-
tinue to shape contemporary identity and individuality in Japan in the same direct and 
indirect, institutional and intellectual ways as I have tried to identity in the Edo period.
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